This transcript of the "Hearing Of The International Organizations, Human Rights And Oversight Subcommittee Of The House Foreign Affairs Committee; Subject [on] The Future Of U.S.-Iraqi Relations [from] The Perspective Of The Iraqi Parliament", was found via Lexus Nexus. The hearing was held June 4, 2008
PANEL I OF A HEARING OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERSIGHT SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE SUBJECT: THE FUTURE OF U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE IRAQI PARLIAMENT WITNESSES: NADEEM AL-JABERI; THE COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES OF IRAQ KHALAF AL-ULAYYAN; THE COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES OF IRAQ CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM DELAHUNT (D-MA) LOCATION: 2172 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. TIME: 02:08 P.M. EDT DATE: WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 2008
(Note: The testimony of Mr. Al-Jaberi and Mr. Al-Ulayyan is provided through interpreters.)
REP. DELAHUNT: We're simply awaiting on the arrival of my good friend and colleague, the ranking member. I think he's delayed somewhat. But, since we have two members of the subcommittee here -- myself and the gentleman from New York, Mr. Meeks, why don't I just simply proceed and then when Mr. Rohrabacher arrives we'll give him an opportunity to make an opening statement.
(Gavel sounds.)
The committee will come to order. Today we are honored to have with us a two distinguished members from the Iraqi Council of Representatives --
(Is interrupted by staff concerning his mike.)
REP. DELAHUNT: My microphone is not on? Hello, hello, hello, hello.
STAFF: (Off mike.) That one's dead.
REP. DELAHUNT: Can you hear me?
STAFF: (Off mike) -- but if you'd like to proceed on this one, you certainly can. I'm sorry.
REP. DELAHUNT: Again, we're having technical difficulties, so to speak.
As I was saying, we're honored to have with us today two distinguished fellow parliamentarians from the Iraqi Council of Representatives, Sheikh Khalaf al-Ulayyan and Professor Nadeem al- Jaberi. Welcome.
I will describe their background in more detail in a moment, but I think it is important to note that the Sheikh is from Anbar in Western Iraq and leads a Sunni coalition. And the Professor lives in Baghdad and leads a Shiite party that is largely based in Basra in Southern Iraq. To have them here together gives me hope that reconciliation in a unified Iraq is still possible following the inevitable U.S. withdrawal.
This is the first time that I'm aware of, since the United States invaded Iraq, that members of the Iraqi parliament have come to Congress to engage in public and private discussions. I can think of no more important relationship for our Congress to develop than this one. And I hope we can formalize this relationship, as an Iraqi- American parliamentary group, as we have without other foreign legislative bodies.
I should tell our guests that I vigorously opposed the invasion and have voted consistently since then to withdraw American troops from Iraq, while my friend and ranking member, Mr. Rohrabacher, has taking a different position. However, you should be assured that there is one thing that both he and I agree on, which is the importance of dialogue and transparency in a democracy as we conduct our affairs. And it is in that spirit that he and I, and the rest of the subcommittee welcome you to our country and to our Congress -- Sheikh and Professor.
Let me now formally introduce our distinguished guests. The Sheikh is a member of the Iraqi parliament, the founder of the National Dialogue Council, a nationalist Sunni Islamic political party. The Sheikh's party is one of three making up the Sunni Accord Front, which holds 44 seats in the 275 member parliament. His party is strongly against any partitioning of Iraq, and strongly in favor of an end to what it calls "the occupation of Iraq" by U.S. and other foreign forces.
The Sheikh served in the Iraqi army until the early 1980s, rising to the rank of general. Since then he has been an influential tribal leader in Anbar Province where there has been a much discussed reduction in violence as a result of Sunni insurgents forming so- called "Awakening" groups.
Dr. Jaberi is also a member of the Iraqi parliament. He is a co- founder of the Fadhila Party, a nationalist Shiite political party based in Southern Iraq. The Fadhila Party, which is also against a long-term presence of any foreign troops, and in favor of maintaining a strong central government, holds 15 seats in the parliament. In March of 2007, the Party withdrew from the ruling Shiite coalition and the executive branch.
Dr. Jaberi has had a long career as a noted political science professor at the University of Baghdad, until teaching became too dangerous in the aftermath of the invasion. The professor is the author of 15 books and has -- and has trained, rather, a generation of Iraqi political scientists, with more emphasis, he says, on the science and less on the politics. More importantly, he became recently a grandfather. And I hope my daughters are listening as I express my congratulations, and a bit of jealousy as well.
Gentlemen, as you present to us whatever you think we need to hear about Iraq and its future, I hope that you will inform us about your perspective on the legal process, and the outstanding issues in Iraq concerning the proposed U.S.-Iraq security and military agreement. Congress has received -- to be polite, minimal information from the Bush administration on the agreement, from the drafting of the Declaration of Principles, to the latest sticking points in the negotiations. So, perhaps you can update us.
It would appear that no single issue is generating more discussion, concern and public protest in Iraq right now than the proposed U.S.-Iraqi Long-term Security Agreement. It seems as if every important political and religious figure has expressed concern about such reported U.S. demands as: combat operations outside of Iraqi command, arrest and detention authority, long-term presence of troops, and immunity for civilian contractors.
Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the Sheikh Muqtada al-Sadr, and even a powerful representative of a party within the executive branch, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, has stated publicly their strong reservations about such provisions. Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, a key Maliki ally, said on Monday, there is an Iraqi national consensus to reject the draft agreement. I would note that no one on this panel has seen, or been informed of a draft agreement, in this country.
And Ali Adeeb of the Dawa Party -- which is also part of the ruling coalition, said, and these are his words, "This agreement is between Iraq and the United States president, and the American policy is not clear. We can wait until the American elections to deal with a Democratic or a Republican president."
As the subcommittee of this House, with responsibility for oversight of State Department activities, we have held a series of five hearings on the negotiations between our government and the government of Iraq on this agreement. With the gracious support of Mr. Rohrabacher, we've heard from legal scholars and regional experts on such topics as: How international agreements are approved in both Iraq and the United States; whether military commitments and authorizations can be contained in sole Executive agreements; and, under what legal authorities U.S. combat forces are now operating in Iraq.
And finally, after months of requests, we were able to ask these questions of administration witnesses in a hearing. And what we heard troubled me all the more. The Bush administration refused to commit to recognizing the constitutional role of the United States Congress in authorizing the commitment of U.S. military forces to fight in Iraq. And I note that the current authority will expire when the United Nations' mandate expires at the end of 2008.
The Bush administration has also been unclear as to its position -- if the Iraqi parliament is bypassed by the Maliki government in any agreement reached by their respective governments. Both of these positions I find unsupported by the testimony of nongovernmental experts from our hearings. Let me suggest that the administration's claims are at variance with reality, but that is not surprising to me.
Here we embrace openness -- not just because it is part of our American value system but also because it is the most effective way to air all our options and come to the wisest, most pragmatic decisions when it comes to our national interests, which by now the very fact of our vision and occupation of Iraq require us to support Iraq's emergence as a viable, healthy and prosperous democracy. That is why we are pleased to have this open and transparent conversation and briefing with our guests today.
Now let me turn to my ranking member and friend from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for any comments that he may wish to make.
REP. DANA ROHRABACHER (R-CA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And obviously this is an issue that all Americans consider to be of great importance. It is important not just to us as Americans who have our young people fighting and dying and being wounded in Iraq, it is also important to the Iraqi people who are also suffering great consequences because of the turmoil there.
I believe that ridding Iraq and ridding the people of Iraq of the monstrous repression that they suffered -- ridding them that repression and by getting rid of Saddam Hussein was a noble thing to do. Saddam Hussein murdered hundreds of thousands of his people and stole vast sums of wealth from his country.
Like any historic endeavor, ridding Saddam Hussein -- or ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein was done at great expense and sacrifice, but there was also many mistakes that were made. There's no great human endeavor that is ever accomplished without mistakes being made.
So the question remains today whether or not the level of mistakes that have been made have soured the people of Iraq toward the United States and whether or not the people of Iraq would like to have the United States continue military operations in that country until certain, what I consider to be evil forces are prevented from taking a dominant role in that country.
I met today, Mr. Chairman, with tribal leaders from the Anbar -- is it Anbar province -- and elsewhere and they expressed to myself and to other members of Congress a gratitude that the United States -- for what the United States has done and expressed the desire that American military personnel be in Iraq for about another two years was their estimate, which would permit them time to be able to meet the challenge.
I'm interested in hearing from you what your reaction is to that, whether or not this does reflect the attitude of the Iraqi people -- are they grateful to the United States or are they resentful about the things that we've done that are maybe mistakes or bad policy? Do Iraqi people want us to stay; do they not want us to stay? How long do you want us to be there?
I would agree with my chairman, the Status of Forces Agreement is essential in defining the direction for the United States as well as defining the future for the people of Iraq. I -- and I also agree with the chairman that this administration has not been open and cooperative with the Congress concerning this Status of Forces Agreement. And it is this -- more than anything else we should be open and honest with our people and let the public debate move forward. And that is not what's happened with the Status of Forces Agreement.
I would ask -- and this is my last question then I'll just move on -- and that is I would hope to find out whether or not the parliament of Iraq is willing to make part of that Status of Forces Agreement a provision that requires Iraq to pay for the future American military operations rather than adding onto the $500 billion Americans have already spent in Iraq. If indeed the Iraqi government is not willing -- the parliament is not willing to spend that money to provide for their own defense or for having American military people there then one has to ask whether or not the American people should be expected to pick of that burden and continue our operations.
So with that said, I'm looking forward to hearing your response to those inquiries and getting a firsthand report from what's going on in Iraq.
Thank you.
REP. DELAHUNT: I thank the ranking member.
And I now yield to the gentleman from New York, Mr. Meeks, for any opening comments that he would like to make.
REP. GREGORY MEEKS (D-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is very timely that you're doing this hearing, I think, and it is a testament to your leadership and your vision that we do have an open government and be able to listen. And I think that's the key.
I joined you, Mr. Chairman -- did not vote for the war, thought it was a badly and ill-conceived war, you know, based upon information that had nothing to do with 9/11 which was part of the reason why we were told we were going there. But I think it is important whether you voted for the war or voted against the war that we have to acknowledge certain realities that are on the ground now. And clearly one of the voices that need to be heard in this day and age as we talk about democracy would be the individuals who make up its parliament, the individuals who are supposed to be the representatives of the people.
There needs to be critical dialogue between us, who are in the legislative branch because we've learned that if we're not included -- just as Mr. Delahunt has indicated that the administration is not including us to the degree that we should be there -- if we're not included, if we're not given all of the information then oftentimes the administration -- wherever it may be and whoever it may be -- can lead the people down the wrong path.
That's why I believe in dialogue. That's why I'm one of the co- chairs of the dialogue caucus. And I believe that especially interparliamentarian dialogue is critical.
All too often, we make decisions in isolation without conversation, without talking to one another. And if the chairman -- and I think, Mr. Chairman, you're right, this is the first time that we've had a delegation of the Iraqi parliamentarians before us, then it's surely, then, a mistake on our part not to have done it sooner, but a credit to you that we're doing it now because we need to hear from those that represent the people in Iraq and what their desires are and what their viewpoints are so that we can make sure that we're working collectively together.
I'll be interested in hearing some of the comments that the ranking member -- some of the questions that the ranking member asks because we do need to know whether or not -- you know, as I feel, and I think that the evidence clearly indicates -- that we need to withdraw from Iraq but we haven't heard as members of Congress from our counterparts on the Iraqi parliament.
You know, we talk about often -- and we use words that I think that sometimes are ill-conceived and sometimes I think can be very dangerous. I mean, when I think about Iraq before our invasion in -- as a result of -- or after 9-11, I ask myself whether or not the evil forces I think that Mr. Rohrabacher was referring to, like al Qaeda, whether or not they were present there then or have they become more present there now and whether or not our presence there creates an opportunity for them to continue their influence in a greater amount there, and whether or not, should we leave, that that would decrease and that the Iraqi people who want to control their own destiny are willing and ready to step up to the plate and to do that. So those are interesting questions that I think that we must ask ourselves.
I think that just to have our president leave us out, we've got to make sure that your president, President Maliki, does not leave you out in your decision-making process. I'm encouraged by the both of you being here, coming from different parties, coming from different positions, but willing to work together on the behalf of the Iraqi people. I believe that, ultimately, the individuals sitting on this side of the aisle that happen to be Democrats and the individuals that happen to be sitting on the other side of the aisle who happen to be Republicans that we will and we must work together for the benefit of the American people. And in this day and age we've got to work collectively in listening to you and your positions so that we can work collectively together to make sure that we're making your region as well as our region and indeed the world a safer place to live.
And in my viewpoint, it becomes much safer when we're not throwing bombs at each other and we're not initiating with bombs but having dialogue to try to prevent that from happening. And that will then make our planet a much safer place. Thank you Mr. Chair for your insight.
REP. DELAHUNT: Yes, thank you Mr. Meeks.
And I'm going to yield now to the gentleman from Texas, former candidate for the presidency of the United States and an active participant in our proceedings and a member who contributes substantially to our own dialogue here.
But before I do yield to him, I want to announce publicly that in our private conversations we have discussed the creation, the formalization if you will, of an interparliamentary dialogue, and I'm hoping that as these two members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives return to their country, they indicate to their colleagues that we on this side, both Republicans and Democrats, are eagerly awaiting the creation of a mechanism which would allow us to continue these conversations and better inform ourselves because legislative bodies in a democracy are absolutely essential, particularly in terms of oversight of the executive branches. Whether the next president be a Democrat or Republican, that oversight is critical. Now with that, I yield to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Paul.
REP. RON PAUL (R-TX): I thank the chairman. I appreciate very much the members of the Council of Representatives of Iraq being here. This is a very worthwhile proceeding. And I want to thank the chairman for holding these very important hearings.
I've taken a very strong position on this issue for a long time because in 1998 when we debated this on the House floor called the Iraqi Liberation Act, I was aghast at what we were planning because at that time, our government decided that we didn't like what was going on in Iraq, and it would be our policy to have regime change. It may have deserved change and I wasn't arguing that case, but I argued against it strenuously at the time believing that that was not our prerogative, that was not our responsibility, that was not a threat to our national security, so I was in strong opposition to this plan that was aid out as early as 1998 for us to go in and forcefully change the government of Iraq.
I've always had the firm conviction that everybody has the right of self-determination and responsibility. So when governments go astray, those individuals in that country have a right and a responsibility to change that government and possibly their neighbors. But to assume that we as a people 6,000 miles away have a moral responsibility to decide exactly who should be the representatives and who should be the government in Iraq, I had strong objection to it. And I objected for the years to come up until the day the bombs started falling, until the troops started marching, arguing the case morally and constitutionally, practically and economically that it was a bad move. And right now we are suffering the consequences of it. So this is the reason I'm so delighted that we have individuals coming from Iraq giving us information to try to sort this out.
It needs sorted out. It should've been prevented, it could've been prevented, and yet now we're in the middle of this because we as a people and as our government, I think, went astray. But because we are suffering the consequences in so many ways, loss of life, so many sick and injured, the financial obligation, that it is my strong position that the sooner we get out of the way and the sooner we turn responsibility over to the Iraqi people, and the sooner we get our heads clear, realizing that we are not the individual, the country, that's supposed to go and dictate to others, the sooner the better.
There is no reason -- there was no reason for our invasion and occupation that had anything to do with our national security. We are less secure today and we are in economic chaos because of this.
So I'm interested to find out whether the Iraqi people are willing to accept the argument that I make that the sooner we get out, the better -- the better for us and the better for the Iraqi people! And hopefully, we will accept a more profound definition of what our responsibilities are around the world.
So I'm looking forward to your testimony.
Thank you.
REP. DELAHUNT: Mr. Flake of Arizona.
REP. JEFF FLAKE (R-AZ): I'd like to hear the witnesses.
REP. DELAHUNT: And I note the presence of the gentleman from North Carolina. An individual who -- I know the two of you have met, a gentleman who has been clear and outspoken in terms of this issue, a man that has demonstrated again and again political courage. And if there's no objection, we will -- I would ask him or his status on the dais here to be considered as a member of the subcommittee for purposes of a statement and any questions he might ask.
And hearing no objection, so ordered.
And with that: Mr. Jones of North Carolina.
REP. WALTER JONES (R-NC): Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And I want to say to the members of this committee: Thank you for giving me this opportunity to sit with you today to hear the testimony, to also ask questions.
I'll make one quick comment: I believe sincerely that going into Iraq was a mistake. I believe that the Iraqi people are wonderful people that I have respect for and believe sincerely that we've got to go from this day forward to understanding the needs and the wants of the Iraqi people and to see what we can do to bridge a relationship.
In addition, I want to say very carefully that -- to my friend Ron Paul, who's a very dear friend of mine -- that years ago when you were debating this issue of whether America should go in or not go into Iraq, you used a statement on the floor that I have used many times and I want to use today, and then I'll close my comments.
You cited from Rudyard Kipling's epitaph of war: "Under the common form, if they ask why we died, tell them because our fathers lied."
Thank you.
REP. DELAHUNT: Thank you, Mr. Jones.
And I'm going to begin by asking a question to both of our colleagues from Iraq, but before I do, I want to read into the record a letter which I received to be distributed to the speaker of the House, to the leadership of the House on both sides and to every member of the American Congress -- both the House and the Senate.
And it begins by saying, "Peace and blessings be upon you. Based on the numerous hearings held by your parliament" -- meaning this committee -- "with regards to the agreement that the executive powers of Iraq and the United States are determined to sign, we the undersigned members of the council wish to confirm your concerns that any international agreement that is not ratified by the Iraqi legislative power is considered unconstitutional and illegal in accordance with the current rulings and laws of the Iraq Republic.
Furthermore, any treatment, agreement or executive agreement that is signed between Iraq and the United States will not be legal. It will not enter the stage of implementation without first being ratified by the Council of Representatives" -- the Iraqi parliament. "In accordance with Article 61 of Section 4 of the Iraqi constitution, which gives the Iraqi government's legislative power -- represented by the Council of Representatives -- the exclusive right to ratify international treaties and agreements.
Likewise, we wish to inform you that the majority of Iraqi representatives strongly reject any military security, economic, commercial, agriculture investment or political agreement with the United States that is not linked to clear mechanisms that obligate the occupying American military forces to fully withdraw from Iraq in accordance with a declared timetable and without leaving behind any military bases, soldiers or hired fighters. The Iraqi Council of Representatives is looking to ratify agreements that end every form of American intervention in Iraq's internal affairs and restores Iraq's independence and sovereignty over its land."
I should note that this is signed by some 34 members. I'm informed that because many of these members are party leaders or so- called block leaders, it represents some 140 members of the Iraqi parliament, which numbers 275.
I'm going to, without objection, enter this into the record. I will be passing this on and I will request Mr. Rohrabacher to pass it on to the Republican leadership in this House for their review, for their verification.
And I think it ought to be made at least part of our briefing here today so that we are fully cognizant of it, as we continue to demand of President Bush and Secretary Rice that any agreement that is beyond the typical status of forces agreement -- and I use that and I underscored the word "typical" -- is brought before the United States Congress, whether it be an international agreement or a treaty, for the approval of this House and the United States Senate.
And with that, let me look to our two guests here today and let me pose a question: Your parties are represented in the letter that I just read "From Iraqi Parliamentarians to the U.S. Congress" that I understand was released yesterday in Baghdad. Could you provide for the subcommittee your interpretation of the significance and the amplification of this particular letter?
Let me begin with Dr. Jaberi. And I will inform the panel that we have expert interpreters here, but that we should allow the interpretation to conclude before we proceed to ask questions.
Dr. Jaberi.
MR. AL-JABERI: Thank you.
First of all, please refer to me as being an Iraqi and not as anything else.
With regard to this document that has been sent to you by a member of the parliament, it expresses the opinions of most members of the parliament. And it certainly expresses the opinion of the majority of the Iraqi people.
REP. DELAHUNT: We need it on, but we need Professor Jaberi to pause so that we can ask the interpreter to translate for us.
MR. AL-JABERI: Perhaps those who have signed this document represent more than half of the members of parliament.
There are many party members and people in general who are very concerned about the signing of this agreement.
Many believe that there must be an equality in the entities who sign this agreement. The Iraqi government right now still does not have full reign of its sovereignty because of the thousands of foreign troops that are on its lands. And perhaps the Iraqi government does not have yet the sufficient tools to run its own internal affairs. And therefore, I ask the American government not to embarrass the Iraqi government in putting it in a difficult situation with this agreement.
What we need to do is help it in achieving its tasks and not burden it with more problems. Therefore, we believe that for any bilateral agreement to be signed, it would be better if this could be done after the withdrawal of the American troops, when Iraq is fully qualified and when the Iraqi government is in a position to defend the interests of the Iraqi people.
We are also concerned about the expediency and acceleration of signing this agreement, because there has been very little time that has elapsed since the Declaration of Principles until this agreement is to be signed. And I do not believe it is appropriate -- it may not be convenient at this time for the United States as it is getting ready to change its administration. And therefore, I ask that looking into this agreement be delayed until a more convenient time.
The other thing is the conditions in which the discussions are being led about signing this agreement. I don't believe that the conditions are convenient at this time for signing such a treaty for more than one reason.
First, we said that the timing was not convenient. Acceleration is not in the interest of the relations between the two countries. And we hope that any future agreement does not affect or impact the Iraqi sovereignty, such as establishing permanent military bases.
Therefore, I see that we study this agreement or treaty with more taking our time in doing so. I believe that having a stable and strong Iraq is in the best interest of the United States and the region. Therefore, accelerating matters is not in the interest of the relation between the two countries.
What emerges from the secret negotiations between the two parties is rather concerning. Today the official spokesperson for the Iraqi government has confirmed this information, and he confirmed that the negotiations are facing some obstacles because they impact the Iraqi sovereignty.
And therefore, many parties have expressed their concern about accelerating the signing of this agreement. And as you know, in the history of international relations, any signing or any bilateral agreements, if they are not between two equal parties, cannot be successful. On the contrary, they may lead to more instability. And these are problems that unequal signatories of treaties can lead to.
Therefore, what we strive for is establishing a balanced relationship between the two countries, but nothing of this could be made possible until the troops withdraw from Iraq, and then negotiate in an objective manner in such a way that the interests of both countries are taken into consideration so that we may reach friendly and solid relations between the peoples of the two countries and our governments.
However, if we were to make an expedient treaty, that may cause problems for the government and the people. And, of course, we do not need to burden them with more problems, because it has other security and economic tasks ahead of it.
We also were very concerned when we heard that this agreement was not to be proposed in front of the Iraqi Parliament. And this goes against the Iraqi constitution. And you cannot put any agreement into application in Iraq, according to the constitution, unless you have majority two-third approval of the Parliament. Therefore, not presenting it to the Parliament may be a factor in this agreement failing.
Thank you.
REP. DELAHUNT: Thank you.
And I would now ask the sheikh if he would respond to my question, and then I'll proceed to go to Mr. Rohrabacher and Mr. Paul. Sheikh Ulayyan.
MR. AL-ULAYYAN: Thank you very much for this meeting.
First of all, I thank all those people who are here in the Congress who are interested in this matter.
I informed the Congress I would like to salute the American people for their stand against the war and which -- the stand which we saw on TVs in the form of demonstrations and protests.
Neither the Iraqi people nor have any hostility for enmity against the United States or their people. In fact, we have whole respect for the American people and for the people who are American.
But now, with regard to --
REP. DELAHUNT: You're going to have to get back up --
MR. AL-ULAYYAN: Now, with regard to the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq, we are not talking about just a withdrawal, we need it to be organized withdrawal. And we would like to have a programmed withdrawal from Iraq. We would like to re-establish the Iraqi forces on a national basis or without any sectarianism or any -- (inaudible).
And in order -- we need an army which can guarantee the security and the stability of Iraq. We also are calling for good relations based on a mutual agreement between all parties. We would like the United States to participate and invest in all aspects of reconstruction in a way that guarantee the interests of both people and for mutual respect.
We, as nationalists -- any withdrawal which is not really started carefully will lead to imbalance or flaws in the security and it will allow Iran to take over Iraq and all the Gulf states. Therefore, we would like to cooperate with the Americans in order to have a withdrawal that's beneficial for both and guarantee the integrity of the United States and its posture in the world and its role in keeping order everywhere in the world.
However, protecting Iraq doesn't mean signing agreement -- long- term agreements like the one being proposed because the presence of military forces in Iraq -- bases in Iraq will guarantee the security of Iraq.
The Iraqi forces don't need bases in Iraq because they have bases in surrounding countries like Jordan, Turkey and so forth. And they have also bases in Kuwait. Therefore, we don't see any importance or need for military bases in Iraq. Therefore we believe this agreement, if it is to go through right now, it will make things more difficult. And we prefer that to delay this agreement until there is a new administration in the United States. Hopefully the new administration will take decisions which serve the interests of the American people and Iraq.
And we don't deny that a new government will need American support in all aspects of this. We will need technical help and training and an army and we would like the presence to be transferred from military presence to a civilian presence.
Thank you.
REP. DELAHUNT: Yes, thank you.
And let me now go to Mr. Rohrabacher.
REP. ROHRABACHER: I need to just get a little more specific. I have some questions here. And maybe you could just -- if it's possible to answer with a yes or no.
Would you have preferred that the United States not have conducted the military operations it did in order to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein? Would you have preferred that we not do that now, in retrospect? Both of you -- both of you could answer it.
Mr. Jaberi?
MR. AL-ULAYYAN: We preferred if it didn't happen because this lead to the destruction of the country.
REP. ROHRABACHER: Okay. So you would have preferred that United States not have gone in and rid -- got rid of Saddam Hussein?
MR. AL-ULAYYAN: The United States got rid of one person but they brought hundreds of persons who are worse than Saddam Hussein.
REP. ROHRABACHER: Okay. Fair -- fair answer.
MR. AL-ULAYYAN: And unfortunately now Iran is going in Iraq and this is under the umbrella of the American occupation of Iraq.
REP. ROHRABACHER: Could I ask this gentleman, maybe -- could you answer that question -- would you have preferred now that in retrospect that United States never was --
MR. AL-JABERI: I prefer that we do not go back and pour into the past because I believe that we have better look at the errors that have been committed and starting from there see how we can rectify the situation.
REP. ROHRABACHER: All right. Okay.
MR. AL-JABERI: But on that subject we cannot really go back in the time machine and rewrite history.
REP. ROHRABACHER: All right. Okay. Now, then my next question is, do you -- currently we have a number of military troops in Iraq. They are engaged in military operations. Do you believe that the United States should maintain these military troops and the operations for a given period of time, or should we begin an immediate withdrawal? And how long -- if you wanted us to stay for a given period of time, what do you think is the time period that you would think would be the limit of which you would have American troops remain active in your country?
MR. AL-JABERI: I believe that Iraq has enough capabilities to defend itself and to build up the military forces that is capable of defending itself and its people. As to the presence of foreign forces, at this time may not be very useful for Iraq. Since 1921, when the Iraqi government was established as an Iraqi state, we have lived without any foreign --
REP. ROHRABACHER: Okay. Again, you're looking back. You're right about looking back. Let me just ask you about looking forward here. So you think that the American troops should begin a withdrawal as soon as possible.
MR. AL-JABERI: Maintaining American troops in Iraq has perhaps happened under certain (conditions ?). But now I believe that this necessity is no longer needed. Considering that Iraq has now started building military force, we certainly do need to improve it, but it is my belief that maintaining foreign troops in Iraq will be a factor of instability both in Iraq and the region.
REP. ROHRABACHER: So you think we should start withdrawing our troops immediately. Is that right?
INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; I didn't hear you, sir.
REP. ROHRABACHER: So he is telling us that he believes the United States should begin withdrawing our troops immediately, at a fast rate.
MR. AL-JABERI: What I am saying is that maintaining the troops --
REP. DELAHUNT: Please, we're having difficulty with (his pause ?). Why don't we try again, okay?
INTERPRETER: Do you hear me now?
REP. ROHRABACHER: We hear you now.
INTERPRETER: How about now?
REP. ROHRABACHER: Okay.
INTERPRETER: No more echo?
REP. ROHRABACHER: We hope not.
INTERPRETER: Thank you. Sorry about that.
REP. ROHRABACHER: So he was saying --
MR. AL-JABERI: (As soon as the ?) -- if foreign troops were to remain in Iraq, they would not be useful for two reasons; because this would prompt many extremist groups to have --
REP. ROHRABACHER: I'm going to have to -- I'm sorry for interrupting, because I only have a limited time to ask my questions, and we could actually talk for hours about why. But let me -- your position is, then -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- that the United States should begin withdrawing its military as soon as possible from your country and cease military operations in your country. Is that correct?
MR. AL-JABERI: (I think ?) that Iraq does not need foreign --
REP. ROHRABACHER: So your position is the United States should start withdrawing our troops. Is that right?
MR. AL-JABERI: I believe that this meaning is very clear.
REP. ROHRABACHER: Okay. We should not hesitate to put ourselves specifically on the record saying that if it's very clear.
Sheikh, I have those questions for you as well. Do you believe that the United States should begin withdrawing its military forces immediately and at a very rapid pace?
MR. AL-ULAYYAN: It is a well-known fact that the occupying power should keep security and order in the country and stay until it builds forces good enough to defend the country and keep security. A lot of destruction took place in Iraq. Yes, we have a big and a strong army. Unfortunately, it is being infiltrated by militia who are loyal to Iran. Therefore, I believe, should the American forces leave now, we will have chaos.
REP. ROHRABACHER: So your answer to the question is no, we should not begin a very quick withdrawal of our American forces. And your colleague is suggesting that we should have a very rapid withdrawal.
MR. AL-ULAYYAN: I would like to see a scheduled withdrawal based on a timetable that would allow enough time to rebuild the forces and make it strong enough to -- (inaudible).
REP. ROHRABACHER: Let me note to you that the Status of Forces Agreement that we are talking about could well include the timetable that you are referring to. And the Status of Forces Agreement, this could include whatever your government and my government wants to agree to. And that should be something that the Parliament, your Parliament, should decide. And also, for the record, I don't know anyone who's advocating permanent U.S. military bases in your country.
INTERPRETER: Your -- (inaudible) -- sometimes I couldn't hear.
REP. ROHRABACHER: I was just saying that we -- the agreement -- it is necessary for us to reach an agreement. We would hope that it would be ratified by the Parliament, as any agreement should be -- (inaudible) -- by Congress, that will lay down the status of forces of our American forces there.
If we do not reach that agreement by the end of this year, American forces will have to withdraw at a very rapid pace because we no longer have a legitimate legal basis from which to operate. So there has to be an agreement by the end of the year. We can't put it off.
And do you believe that your opinion, that the U.S. forces should not begin a rapid withdrawal right now, represents a majority of the Parliament, or does your colleague's opinion that American forces should begin a rapid withdrawal now represent the attitudes of your other members of Parliament?
MR. AL-ULAYYAN: This -- (inaudible) -- will be fully explained and this will take a long time. But in brief, from the (pieces ?) we saw from that agreement, we didn't see anything related to a scheduled withdrawal or timetable. We understood there will be (permanent ?) military bases in Iraq, and this is unacceptable for the Iraqis.
But we have no reasons to reject the American forces' presence for a year, two, maybe three, until we have our army ready and able to --
REP. ROHRABACHER: And does that attitude -- is that reflected in the majority of the Parliament? That's what I need to know.
Is this -- (audio break) -- attitude's different? Or -- this is a different attitude. Yeah.
MR. AL-ULAYYAN: I believe most Iraqis are interested in a timetable for the withdrawal which allows time to rebuild the Iraqi forces and I don't think there is any --
(Cross talk.)
MR. ROHRBACHER: Thank you very much. That was a very good answer and I appreciate that. I met with members of the tribal leaders this morning. That seemed to be the prevalent idea that we would like to know when forces will be withdrawn, but a support for continued American military operations by the United States in the country. That seems to be, Mr. Chairman, what I am gleaning from our visitors today from leaders from Iraq. Thank you.
MR. DELAHUNT: Before I go to Mr. Paul, I think what I hear and what's reflected in the letter of the majority of Iraqi parliamentarians is that before they sign an agreement in terms of all of these issues, what they are looking for is a timetable for withdrawal. And what we have witnessed in the past is the refusal of the Bush administration and the Maliki government, I'm sure at the insistence of the Bush administration, not to incorporate a timetable for withdrawal so that the American people and the Iraqi people have clear understanding of where we go from this point in time. With that, I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
REP. PAUL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a question or two for Dr. Al-Jaberi.
MR. AL-JABERI: May I ask a question please so that you have the full picture if you don't mind? What are the threats that you foresee on Iraq if the troops withdraw, so that I may answer you?
REP. ROHRBACHER: What was the question?
(Off mike exchange.)
REP. ROHRBACHER: That will be totally up to you to determine. Frankly, if you want American forces there, for whatever reason, and we're willing to have them there to fight with you, you will determine whether or not the threat is worthy of having American troops there. That's up to you to decide.
If the parliament decides that American troops should withdraw immediately, believe me, there's not a group of Americans here saying, oh, if they -- if their parliament doesn't want us that we should stay there. So that's up to you, and I'm just trying to determine whether or not -- what your views are about the presence of American military troops. So it sounds like most of the leaders want to have us there for a given period of time, maybe two to three years more. That, to me, is actually a long time to be there, but I'm -- it's up to you to decide that, not us.
MR. AL-JABERI: I would like you to rest assured there are no threats on Iraq. We can defend ourselves in case of foreign aggression. And we are capable of solving our own problems in the end. Thank you.
REP. DELAHUNT: And with that, I'll go to Mr. Paul for his opportunity to inquire.
Before I do, let me notice the presence of the gentleman from the state of Washington, Mr. Jim McDermott. And for purposes of this briefing, without objection, we will agree that he sits here as a member of the committee for purposes of inquiry. And with that, Mr. Paul.
REP. PAUL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a question for Dr. Al-Jaberi. And this has to do with our withdrawal because I do believe, in time, we will have a withdrawal. Whether it's done under a deliberate decision and wise decision, we will withdraw because eventually we won't be able to afford it, and we're getting close to that.
But let's say that tomorrow, our government announces that we're coming home and we're going to be home and the troops will be out of Iraq in six months. Is that too fast, too slow or a reasonable length of time for us to leave?
MR. AL-JABERI: I would like for us to agree on the principle first. Details are to be discussed by the experts, the military. It's their job to figure these things out. I just would like to assert that Iraq is capable to defend itself. But deciding whether it is within six months or a year or more is to be discussed by the experts in the military. So, as a political decision, we have to agree first on the principle and then let the military decide on the timetable if there should be one because, if we do agree on this principle, that in of itself will contribute to stability in Iraq.
REP. PAUL: Okay. I'm disappointed with the answer because what you're saying, it's open-ended, six months, year, two years and it seems like it would be much easier to say that -- militarily it wouldn't take much effort to ask a military person exactly how long it would take to do it. But to say that politically we might need to take a year or a year-and-a-half or two, it doesn't support the position that we need to leave. It just supports the position that we can procrastinate forever.
I want to follow up, because I think I got your answer on that. I want to follow up and say can you give me an idea that if we did make this announcement, even if we accept your position that it could be six months or a year, what percent of the Iraqi people would support us leaving in a reasonable time of six months-plus under the circumstances you describe? Is it a small number of people or almost all of them? What percent of the Iraqi people would agree with us leaving under those circumstances?
MR. AL-JABERI: I ask you to perhaps have a referendum, and that will tell you the truth.
REP. PAUL: So you have no idea. You have no idea. Maybe only 5 percent want to support us leaving. You have to have an idea.
MR. AL-JABERI: Of course not. The majority of the people of Iraq are with the withdrawal.
REP. PAUL: Fifty-one percent?
MR. AL-JABERI: Perhaps even about 70 percent.
REP. PAUL: Okay. Okay, that's good. When we leave, how will it be perceived if we leave the embassy with our presence there in the super-embassy of the world? Do we have to deal with that symbolically? Does that rub some people in Iraq the wrong way that we have the biggest embassy in the world, big as the Vatican? Or do we have to address that subject and say, "When we leave we're going to have a small embassy appropriate for what we should do to have an embassy in that country?"
MR. AL-JABERI: The embassy in Iraq has a incredible large amount of staff. It is certainly larger than the diplomatic mission for which it has arrived for. I have information that there may be about 3,000 employees. And there certainly is another view than the one that we see. And, yes, there is some procrastination in its relationship with the society because its relations are limited to the green zone. And even within the green zone, not everyone has good --
REP. PAUL: Let me narrow this down. Would it be not good policy for us to keep that embassy that big? Or would you advise, look, when you leave it's not good for the Americans to have this embassy. Do you think that for public relations reason we should address that or do you think it would be an insignificant event for the Iraqi people to maintain that embassy as it stands?
MR. AL-JABERI: This is the same question I ask myself. I mean, why do we need 3,000 employees in an embassy in Iraq if we consider it as a diplomatic mission like any other diplomatic mission?
REP. PAUL: Okay. I understand that.
MR. AL-JABERI: So from the principle of reciprocity, would it be appropriate for the Iraqis to establish a 3,000-employee embassy in Washington? (Laughter.)
REP. PAUL: I understand that. I understand that part. But what I want to know is the emotional public relations reaction to the Iraqi people if we stay there. Do we still have a problem when we have that presence, along with military bases, even though we claim we have left? It seems to me that we have to know what leaving really means. (Laughter.)
MR. AL-JABERI: It certainly would not be a very positive signal to the Iraqi people. If you maintain a reasonable-sized embassy in Iraq, that could open up to the Iraqi society --
REP. PAUL: So you think that would be good for relations.
MR. AL-JABERI: Yes. And have relations with the political elite and the society.
REP. PAUL: And would you have that same assessment with our military bases?
MR. AL-JABERI: The military bases are a different story. Diplomatic missions are done in all international relations and are no problems with it. We may have some differences on the number, on the kind, but that's all good for -- I mean, we can always negotiate these things.
But military bases, even the Ayatollah al-Sistani has decreed that no agreement or treaty should allow the presence of military bases.
REP. PAUL: Okay. So the answer really is that the people would be less tolerant of the military bases than some embassy. I mean, the argument would be that indeed we need to address the subject of military bases because that is an affront to the Iraqi people, is that correct?
MR. AL-JABERI: Yes, there definitely is some resentment for the presence of military bases. Not for diplomatic presence.
REP. PAUL: Right. And therefore we must address the military bases. And I yield back. Thank you.
REP. DELAHUNT: I thank the gentleman.
Now to the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake.
REP. FLAKE: Thank you. And I apologize for -- I had a meeting outside and missed your testimony, and so I apologize if I cover ground that's already been covered.
But with regard -- let me address the current surge, if you will, in forces that's occurred over the last year or so.
The drop in violence that we've seen, to what do you attribute that? Is it the increase in the number of troops or is it agreements with various groups there that have gone on? What is the major cause of the reduction in violence, at least against our troops in Iraq?
REP. DELAHUNT: Sheikh, could you please respond?
MR. AL-ULAYYAN: Increasing the number of forces didn't affect the level of violence in Iraq because the war there is a war against gangs, and they are like ghosts. They hit and run. What led to the reduction of terrorism acts and violence is the forces of al-Saqa. Those are volunteers from the tribes, from the tribes of the areas where terrorists are more, and those forces, al-Saqa, managed to eliminate the other party, the terrorists, because they know their men. They know their tactics.
We suggested that a long time ago for our government and for the American government, but nobody listened. And I believe the reduction of the level of violence is due mainly to the efforts of the volunteers.
And I believe that the thing which will reduce the violence more, not the military force, but having realistic solutions which will convince others to join the political process. And I believe that this method to achieve that is a real national reconciliation. We need the real reconciliation, not only slogans, as being done now.
And the reconciliation should involve all the Iraqis, whether they are involved right now in a -- the political process or not.
REP. FLAKE: Right. If I could --
MR. AL-ULAYYAN: And the reconciliation should have other elements. For example the constitution -- submitting the constitution and just do away with federalism -- (inaudible) -- eliminate federalism based on sectarianism and groups. But if we have to have federalism, it has to be geographic federalism.
And we need new, transparent, and fair elections. And we have to do away with quotas and we have to be based on our own nationalistic -- and we have to get back those refugees who are in Jordan and other countries. And the total of them 4,600,000. We have to get them back and we have to compensate them for their losses and suffering.
The prisoners, whether they are in Iraqi jails or American jails, must be released. If we really achieve all these points, then we will have order and -- law and order in the country, even without the presence of any military -- foreign military forces, and American forces can withdraw.
REP. FLAKE: Okay. Thank you. And I'd just ask a quick follow- up.
It's often stated here that a timetable, a firm timetable for withdrawal will embolden the enemy, be they gangs, be they terrorists, be -- whatever form the violence has taken. Would embolden them or enable them to basically have their own timetable and sit in waiting until the troops are sufficiently out.
Do you see that as a truism? Is that an axiom we should subscribe to or not?
We know that we can't be there forever, so we'll have to withdraw at some point. What does a timetable do, in your minds, with regard to the elements there that are causing the violence?
I'm sorry if that's already been answered before I came in.
REP. DELAHUNT: Mr. Jaberi, could you answer the question?
REP. FLAKE: I apologize. I heard that both of you are advocating timetables. But if you could address that, do you see that as a problem? Because we often hear that as justification for not having a timetable, that the enemy can simply lie in waiting. Do you see that as a problem?
MR. AL-JABERI: I said a few moments ago that many of the armed militias -- (inaudible) -- were established in order to fight the presence of foreign troops on their land. So their justification is to liberate Iraq from the foreign troops in jihad. So as soon as the troops have withdrawn, they have no more justification to exist, because it doesn't make sense for them to start killing their own compatriots.
It is my belief that when the troops withdraw, these groups will not bear arms any longer. And for as long as we have foreign troops on our land, these groups will actually increase in number. They will hold on to their goals even further and -- for the justification of their existence.
So I say that the presence of foreign troops is actually serving these groups. In case of a withdrawal, then we can rehabilitate them so that they become civilians and then introduce them and include them in the democratic process in Iraq.
Thank you.
REP. DELAHUNT: Sheikh?
MR. AL-ULAYYAN: With regard to the timetable, it has to be prepared by people who are specialized and people who are specialized in the matter can decide on the timetable, when it starts, when it ends.
And I support what the doctor has said. Once we have a timetable, we will see that these terrorism acts will stop, because there will be no justification.
REP. DELAHUNT: Thank you, and let me go now to Mr. Jones of North Carolina.
REP. WALTER JONES (R-NC): Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I'm sorry that I had to leave for a few minutes, too. I'm probably the only one on the dais that is on the Armed Services Committee here in Washington, D.C. I'm on the House Armed Services Committee.
And ever since -- for at least the last two or three years, the administration has said when the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down. And --
(Exchange off mike.)
I apologize for that. I'm from the South, and I thought I spoke slow enough anyway, so I apologize.
(Laughter.)
The -- recently -- and being on the Armed Services Committee, we get testimony from generals who have been in Iraq about the training of the Iraqi security forces. And I would say that over the last three or four years those who have been testifying have been encouraging. And I don't dispute that, and I'm not with this question.
But USA Today last week or the week before had headlines that the Iraqi security forces were way behind. So if the administration is using "when the Iraqis stand up we'll stand down," my question is, as the leaders of your government, what is your assessment of the Iraqi security forces?
MR. AL-JABERI: The true vulnerability in our forces is because it was established according to the principles of Ambassador Bremer (sp), which is the decision, or Executive Order 91, that stipulated that militias be added to the armed forces. That was a negative mechanism.
It has created security forces that have different allegiances, loyalties, and has created military figures who are not qualified because they have never joined any military academy, but were granted military ranks according to their service in the militias. And therefore, the security forces have suffered from the results of this action during their operations in Basra and the prime minister has complained from the desertion of some of the elements during those operations.
However, this mechanism is now being rectified and the latest events have uncovered this matter. So as soon as we correct our approach and provide the military forces of Iraq with the appropriate training and equipment, then we will make them able and qualified to defend their country and their people in a national and nationalistic way.
Thank you.
REP. JONES: One thought very quickly, Mr. Chairman.
If the suggestion that the -- that you now understand what the problem is and you are making the necessary corrections -- I'm talking about the Iraqi security forces -- if there could be a time, how long will it take to satisfy the statement by the administration when the Iraqis stand up, the Americans will stand down? When do you think -- or, how long do you think it would take for the security forces to be where you need them to be to be able to defend the country?
REP. DELAHUNT: Sheikh? I'm going to ask the sheikh if he can respond, given his military background.
MR. AL-ULAYYAN: We -- in fact, we -- the Iraqis don't need much training because most of them -- or all of them -- has military training, since we have a draft where everybody has to join the army at one point.
And we have many officers, and warrant officers who are trained and ready, actually, to go back and take over and rebuild the army. Should we need military experience or -- what they call it, technical experience for training, then we can recruit some Americans who will work at the military academies in Iraq. And this -- doesn't necessarily have to have large troops in Iraq.
The problem is not lack of training or expertise, but the problem that we have are the forces which are being infiltrated by people who are working for Ba-athists or for other factions. If we get rid of those members who are supporting other factions or parties, and bring back the professional military -- national military people, then we have no problem.
And in this case, the army -- we can transfer the army to a nationalistic army, and based on the nationalism and not based on loyalty to parties or factions. And I believe this is the right solution for our problem.
REP. JONES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. DELAHUNT: If I can restate what you said, you feel confident that there is available a professional cadre of military, and that the problem is not so much in training but in allegiance. And that the Iraqi security forces have been infiltrated by elements that have allegiance to a particular group.
Reports have come to our attention -- that are in the public domain, that in the recent offense -- offensive in Basra against the Mahdi Army, the militia that is loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr, was motivated because of a political rationale, which is the forthcoming elections. And that another faction, also a Shiite faction, that had a militia called the Badr Brigade have become a -- have become part of the Iraqi security forces.
And this has created a problem even within the Shiite community. Now I understand that the prime minister has made a statement that it is his purpose -- or his goal to eliminate militias.
I have a question for both of you, we have not spoken about the people in Northern Iraq, the Kurdish population of Iraq, although I would note that one Kurdish lawmaker, Abdullah Sagana has been reported to say regarding the agreement, "We have not been informed about the content of the talks. There is absolutely no way that the Iraqi government can make any such agreements without the consent of the Iraqi parliament."
Another Kurdish lawmaker, Mahmoud Osman, who is an independent Kurdish lawmaker not affiliated with the PDK or the Kurdistan Party, said this, and I'm quoting, "To have a long-term agreement with the Bush administration, which has five months to go, is wrong." He added, "The Iraqi government should wait for the new American administration and then have an agreement with it." That was a digression.
Now, for my question: If Prime Minister Maliki wishes to end militias in Iraq, and create a national professional army and a national professional police, have the Kurdish elements in Iraq agreed to eliminate or terminate the Peshmurga. And if they have not, what's the likelihood of that occurring?
MR. AL-ULAYYAN: Mr. Maliki, the prime minister, changed a lot actually, in his policies. And now he is more -- his orientation more nationalistic and more beneficial for Iraq, whether it is to fight the militias -- whether they are Sunnis or Shiites, who are outlaws. Also, he had the law where he forgive those who will lay their arms, and he will help the people who were forced to leave their areas.
And we see he did a lot of things which deserve cooperation, in order to encourage him to go ahead with this nationalistic approach. But we have to know that there is a lot of pressure internally and from outside. And these are pressures against his new orientation, and will prevent, actually, achieving what he wants to achieve. And these are things all the Iraqi people want, not only Mr. Maliki.
With regard to Peshmurga, I don't think that Kurdish -- the Kurd parties will agree to eliminate those -- They want to have 12 divisions of Peshmurga. And they want it to be equipped with airfighers, tanks. And they don't want the Iraqi army to have even a mortar.
According to our rules, each governorate should have only one brigade. And the Kurds have three governorates, therefore, they should have three brigades only.
But he gave them three times of that -- Mr. Maliki gave them three times of that. And the way we see it, there should be an agreement between the government and the Kurds, and we accept it to be under the supervision of the United States, and we will accept a reasonable-sized force of Peshmurga, but it has to be somehow linked to the army forces -- Iraqi forces.
They could operate only in Kurdistan to protect that area, but it has to take orders from the Iraqi commands or they should be transformed to a small police unit to take care of internal security. I believe this problem can be solved by supervision and help of the American government.
REP. DELAHUNT: Thank you, Sheikh.
And now Professor Jaberi.
MR. AL-JABERI: With regard to Peshmurga, it is perhaps to be distinguished from other militias in certain aspects -- perhaps in its interest, not against it. It has been recognized in the Iraqi constitution as belonging to a region.
The officers of that organization -- during the period starting 1992 when Kurdistan separated somewhat from Iraq, have attended military academies in the region. So it may be qualified, or better qualified than the others, and has been able to add, or give itself legitimacy, or a legal aspect.
The others may not have these specifications. Most of them have not attended military academies and, therefore, are facing difficulties in managing the military institutions. And, therefore, they are now a burden on the institutions because they have occupied offices and positions that they are not qualified for scientifically.
We can perhaps rehabilitate them to occupy civilian positions, and then take advantage of the military experience that we have among our people, notwithstanding their belonging to either a social or political entity.
We do not want to remain a hostage to the Coda system any longer. This policy is too primitive and is not appropriate for a civilized country. It has obstructed the political process and has obstructed the institution of civilian establishments, and even the administrative ones. Thank you.
REP. DELAHUNT: I want to express my profound gratitude for your patience. We are now called to vote and we will be gone for approximately an hour. You've spent some two hours with us. It has been very informative. I wish you very much success in your trip here.
I know you have a series of other meetings and, as I indicated in my initial remarks, I look forward to an ongoing parliamentary group where we can have discussions such as this so our respective peoples have a better understanding of the challenges that confront the Iraqi people and the American people.
I think this has been an excellent beginning. There is no easy answer. And, again, I agree with those -- and I think with you, that we have to look forward in terms of where do we go from here.
This is going to be a challenging year here in the United States where we have elections. It will be a challenging year in Iraq, where you are scheduled to have elections. You've indicated to me that you would hope that the U.S. Congress would request independent monitors -- whether they came from the United Nations, or from the European Union or from the Arab League -- to monitor your elections. I think that is a extremely reasonable request.
I will discuss it with Mr. Rohrabacher and our respective leaderships. And I feel confident in saying that we will do what we can to assist you in securing that request, because the legitimacy of your elections -- as you have indicated to us over the course of the last several days, is extremely important. We respect that.
Again, many, many thanks. I hope, again, that your trip home is safe and that you have benefited from our exchanges and that we continue to have these meetings, as I said, to benefit all of us. Thank you.
And we'll stay adjourned, but we're coming back to listen to one of America's foremost experts on the Middle East, and that's Mr. Katzman from the Congressional Research Service, so he can give us some further insight. And he has to wait here for an hour.
But we hope to see you at another time. Thank you.
MR. AL-JABERI: I also would like to express my appreciation and thanks for this opportunity to exchange opinions freely. We certainly will endeavor to pursue the idea of exchanges between the two parliaments. And we expect that you will play a very important role in monitoring the next elections. Thank you.
I'm going home tonight to take a pick, i'm very excited about this (clearly you see how sad and crazy i am about shoes.) Will post the picture
Posted by: red bottom | November 27, 2011 at 03:32 AM